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Thought, Language, and Inner Speech
A Reply to Ulrike Pompe-Alama
Adina Roskies
Pompe-Alama’s  commentary  raises  interesting  issues  regarding  the  nature  of
thought and its relation to language. She underlines the evolutionary relationship
we have to other animals and results from cognitive science to argue that human
thought is probably not fundamentally linguistic, and notes that the pull of the
phenomenal experience of inner speech may mislead us into thinking it is. While I
agree with these claims, I disagree that Davidson’s own arguments are predicated
on an inner speech view, and raise problems for the idea that functional imaging
will easily resolve the debate about the relation of thought and language.
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1 Introduction
I largely concur with Pompe-Alama’s comment-
ary on my contribution to this collection. She
nicely summarizes my arguments against what I
call  Davidson’s  “Master  Argument,”  an  argu-
ment  that  he  levies  against  the  possibility  of
propositional  attitudes  for  nonlinguistic  anim-
als. As Pompe-Alama notes, aside from concep-
tual  clarifications,  my  arguments  are  largely
empirical.  As  such,  the  strength  of  my argu-
ments depends on the solidity of the empirical
facts  they  are  based  upon.  But  provisionally,
since  all  the  logically  valid  reconstructions  of
Davidson’s arguments have what look to be em-
pirically false premises, none serves to establish
the impossibility of animal thought. 
Pompe-Alama  then  offers  an  interesting
discussion of the Davidsonian claim that nonlin-
guistic animals cannot have propositional atti-
tudes. She locates the source of the dispute at
the  phenomenological  level,  citing  the  phe-
nomenology of thought as “inner speech”, and
suggests that it is this that leads Davidson, and
us, to mistakenly think that thinking is funda-
mentally  a  language-dependent  phenomenon.
While I disagree that this is the source of Dav-
idson’s perspective, I appreciate Pompe-Alama’s
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discussion  of  some  important  practical  con-
sequences of the Davidsonian view, or any view
that posits human thought processes to be qual-
itatively different than those of all other anim-
als.  In  her  discussion,  Pompe-Alama  tells  us
that  contemporary  cognitive  science  indicates
that Davidson is wrong, and suggests that our
own  understanding  of  our  own  thought  pro-
cesses may be adversely influenced by our intro-
spective recognition of our thoughts as embod-
ied in inner speech. She cautions that too much
attention to the phenomenological or introspect-
ive sense of inner speech can prevent us from
exploring  the  representational  aspects  and
physiological  bases  of  thought  that  we  share
with other animals, and moreover, she suggests
that  taking  language  to  be  a  necessary  pre-
requisite for thinking poses a barrier to under-
standing human thought as well. As a remedy,
she suggests that we discount the phenomenal
aspects of thinking and instead focus on a re-
ductive strategy for exploring the neural basis
of human and animal thought in a bottom-up
fashion.
2 Inner speech
Pompe-Alama calls attention to the “feeling of
what it is like to think”, which she identifies as
the experience of our thoughts as inner speech.
There is of course debate about whether it feels
like anything at all to think. However, regard-
less of whether our recognition of inner speech
is a feeling or a cognitive introspective conclu-
sion, this phenomenon certainly plays a role in
the general tendency to and perhaps our will-
ingness to identify thought with language. But
Pompe-Alama’s easy identification of  the phe-
nomenology  of  inner  speech  with  Davidson’s
denial of animal thought threatens to trivialize
what I take to be a fairly sophisticated, if incor-
rect, view about the nature of animal thought.
Davidson’s interpretationism is the root of his
denial,  and  his  target  is  specifically  proposi-
tional thoughts and related attitudes, not cog-
nitive processing more generally. Pompe-Alama
cites  Vygotsky’s  claim that  lots  of  thought is
not  verbal  thought,  and  she  suggests  that
pictorial or imagistic thought should be possible
for  non-linguistic  creatures.  I  don’t  suppose
Davidson would refuse to recognize that animals
have complex representations and even some re-
latively high-level  cognitive  capacities.  But he
would  deny  that  these  forms  of  thought  had
propositional contents. So the real question at
issue is whether the representational power af-
forded by representations in nonlinguistic anim-
als allows them to represent propositions.
That said, Pompe-Alama’s claim that the
restriction of thought to verbal vehicles may be
a “theory-induced illusion” is  well  taken.  The
tendency to think that only language-like for-
mulations allow propositional content to be cap-
tured  or  delineated  seems  ungrounded,  espe-
cially  since  philosophy  has  supplied  us  with
non-linguistic  means  of  representing  proposi-
tions (Stalnaker 1987),  or  alternatives  to pro-
positional  attitudes  (Churchland 1992).  Un-
doubtedly, propositional content requires some
kind of framework that permits complex struc-
tural relationships between representations, but
there is no a priori reason to think that such
structure can only be achieved with linguistic
implementation.  Pompe-Alama  is  correct  to
point out that in our own interpretation of oth-
ers, we often privilege behavior over self-report,
and  much  social  science  has  suggested  that
words, and indeed even one’s own introspective
thoughts, are not a reliable window into higher
cognitive processes. She also mentions that our
own interpretational skills, applied to animals,
yields  attributions  of  cognitive  processes  that
are in many ways akin to our own. Indeed, we
easily attribute to them propositional attitudes.
These observations put pressure on Davidson’s
view, and raise the question of what our own
propositional attitudes may endow us with, cog-
nitively speaking,  that  the presumptively pro-
positional-attitudeless animals are missing, if in
fact he turns out to be right.
Pompe-Alama  doubts  whether  language
really plays a key role in human higher cognit-
ive functions. We know it certainly does in one
of them: Linguistic cognition. Whether it plays
a fundamental  role  in  other aspects  of  higher
cognition is yet unknown. Davidson himself is
not clear about whether he thinks language is
necessary as a vehicle for thought. This distin-
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guishes him from Fodor, who also thinks lan-
guage is central to thought, but posits a mental
language to serve as the vehicle of thought, and
that is available to linguistic and non-linguistic
creatures alike. Davidson’s view is more subtle,
and seems to depend more on social/interper-
sonal factors and abilities or dispositions than
on vehicles per se. Thus, for Davidson, the fact
that we can identify instances of non-linguistic
symbol use in high-level thought is not telling,
since it is the fact that we are language-using
creatures  that  is  of  prime  importance.  It  is
within  Davidson’s  purview  to  claim  that  our
mastery  of  language  makes  possible  thoughts
that rely on non-linguistic (yet symbolic) prop-
erties.
3 Methodological difficulties
Pompe-Alama suggests that to lessen the grip
of the illusion, we must pay attention to the low
level  realization  of  our  thoughts.  That  is  of
course a goal of many cognitive neuroscientists,
but as Pompe-Alama well recognizes, it is a dif-
ficult one to achieve. Unlike perception and ac-
tion, both which can be correlated with measur-
able external phenomena (perception with the
stimuli occurring in the external world; action
with elicited motor activity), thoughts are seem-
ingly spontaneous, and largely uncoupled from
immediate environmental stimulation and con-
trol. The unpredictability of the content and oc-
currence of our thoughts, together with the fact
that we have no idea how they are realized in
neural activity (and thus which aspects of the
remarkably complex signals we can record from
the  brain  are  relevant),  has  the  consequence
that thoughts promise to be extremely difficult
to measure scientifically.  What exactly are we
supposed to look for in signals from neural tis-
sue that is supposed to correspond to proposi-
tional thoughts as opposed to other (non-pro-
positional) forms of mental representation? Un-
less we discover some means of answering this
question, it will be difficult to determine empir-
ically whether other animals have the capacity
for propositional thought or not.
Taking  a  reductive  approach,  Pompe-
Alama says “the question of how far thinking
relies on our capacity to speak or use language
can be replaced by the question of which brain
areas  and  input-output  relations  we  find  in-
volved in the faculties mentioned above” (this
collection, p. 6). She suggests that the progress
we have made in understanding the neural basis
of language processing could help us resolve the
debate  about  whether  human  and  nonhuman
cognitive processes are fundamentally different.
Work in cognitive science has shown that a net-
work  of  brain  areas  seem  consistently  linked
with  processing  of  natural  language.  Pompe-
Alama  suggests  that  we  could  approach  the
question of whether human thought is primarily
linguistic  by determining with functional  ima-
ging whether these areas are consistently active
during human propositional thought. This will
not be determinative, for reasons I sketch here.
Most importantly, even if we do see activity in
these areas, it will not serve to answer the ques-
tion of whether human thought is fundament-
ally  linguistically-based.  Suppose  phenomenal
inner speech typically accompanies our thought,
and it is dependent on activity in these areas.
This may be because our thoughts are funda-
mentally linguistic, but it could also be merely
a causal consequence of the deeper thought pro-
cesses, without constituting them or being a ne-
cessary component of them at all. Thus, if we
consistently  saw  activity  in  language-relevant
areas, it might not be reflective of the funda-
mental nature of our thought. Suppose, on the
other hand, that we failed to see such activation
(and suppose we knew that inner  speech was
dependent  on  activation  of  language  areas).
This could be due to the low signal-to-noise ra-
tio of the methods, or to the fact that language
pervades brain representation and is not restric-
ted to the areas that we typically see “light-up”
in a language task, or it could indicate the non-
linguistic  nature  of  thought.  In  this  domain,
negative  results  are  not  decisive.  Thus,  the
question of whether language centers are always
active during human propositional thought will
not resolve the issue.
That  said,  significant  progress  is  being
made in understanding at least some aspects of
the representational coding of thought contents.
The  object  perception  literature  demonstrates
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that cognitive neuroscience has achieved much
in the last  few years,  due to work with both
noninvasive  fMRI  in  humans  and  invasive  re-
cording in humans and nonhuman primates. In
particular, we have gained much greater insight
into the representational coding of faces, with
access to regional information about coding of
representational aspects of face identity, similar-
ity, expression, and so on (see e.g., Haxby et al.
2014, and  Freiwald &  Tsao 2011). Other work
suggests  that  the  visual  cortex  represents
sematic features in the form of a cortical map
(Huth et al. 2012). Although this kind of work
is in its infancy, novel analytical and modeling
techniques promise to continue to yield a deeper
understanding of how our brains represent se-
mantic  properties.  An  important  result  stem-
ming from this kind of research is evidence of
the  extensive  homologies  between  neural  pro-
cesses  of  visual  representation in  humans and
nonhuman primates (Sha et al. in press;  Kiani
et al. 2007). These homologies seem to extend
in  large  part  to  complex  cognitive  processes
such as decision-making (Gold & Shadlen 2007).
At  the  neural  level,  we  have  no  evidence  of
qualitative differences in neurological processing
between humans and nonhuman primates, nor
evidence that we and they possess radically dif-
ferent representational frameworks. Nonetheless,
none of  the work mentioned explicitly targets
propositional  contents,  and  very  little  extant
work has looked at the combinatorial or struc-
tural properties of these mental representations.
In my own view, answers to these difficult ques-
tions will not come from bottom-up approaches
alone or even in large part. Only a high-level
theory of brain function is likely to make real
headway on this issue. It will be interesting to
see whether new work in predictive coding (see
Clark this collection;  Hohwy this  collection;
Seth this collection) allows for new ways of ap-
proaching these fundamental questions.
4 Conclusion
Pompe-Alama seems to argue that Davidson’s
argument  about  the  impossibility  of  animal
thought is  at base an argument based on the
phenomenology  of  thought  as  inner-speech.  I
don’t  see  this.  His  is  an  argument  about the
process of interpretation, and the interpersonal
nature  of  objective  thought.  While  I  disagree
with  Davidson’s  arguments,  and  in  particular
with the view that animals cannot have propos-
itional attitudes, I am nonetheless sympathetic
to  the  possibility  that  the  ability  to  use  lan-
guage  makes  possible  cognitive  feats  that  are
unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures (see e.g.,
Roskies 2015). These may only be quantitative
differences,  allowing  us  to  represent  contents
that nonlinguistic creatures cannot represent, or
they may be more qualitative leaps, such as giv-
ing us metarepresentational abilities that make
possible  culture,  cross-generational  learning,
and science. Thus, whether Davidson is right or
wrong,  we  are  still  left  with  the  fascinating
question: What does language or linguistic com-
petence  allow  us  to  do  that  we  otherwise
couldn’t do?
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